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BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: WHAT ABORTION
TEACHES US ABOUT AMERICAN POUTICS
ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS. By Barbara Hinkson Craig
and David M. O'Brien. Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1993. Pp. xvi, 382. $30.00.

Reviewed by Neal Devins*
Roe v. Wade 1 '\vas designed to help put an end to the abortion dispute. Justice Harry Blackmun put forth a trimester test governing state
authority over the abortion decision both to make clear what the Court
intended and to foreclose future governmental efforts to sidestep the
Court's decision. 2 Over objections by Justice Potter Stewart that the draft
opinion was "inflexibly 'legislative,' "3 Blackmun nonetheless persisted in
his efforts to clarify the reaches and limits of governmental authority in
this area.
Twenty-one years later, the abortion wars rage on, and Blackmun's
belief that Roe might settle the issue seems to have been-to put it
mildly-hopelessly naive. What Blackmun did not take into account was
the inevitable backlash from elected government at both the state and
federal levels. "UJudges,'' as Blackmun's newest colleagne Ruth Bader
Ginsburg has written, "play an interdependent part in our democracy. They
do not alone shape legal doctrine but ... they participate in a dialogue
with other organs of government, and with the people as well." 4 Indeed,
Ginsburg went so far as to suggest in December 1992 that Roe "prolonged
divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the [abortion] issue" by
short-circuiting early, 1970s legislative reform efforts.5 Although Justice
Ginsburg overstates her claim,6 there is no doubt that Roe is a point of

* Professor of Law, Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary. Thanks
to Laura Brill and Wendy Watson for their help and encouragement.
1. 410 u.s. 113 (1973).
.
2. The trimester test rejected state regulation of abortion during the first trimester of
a pregnancy, approved reasonable state regulation during the second trimester, and
authorized the prohibition of third trimester abortions. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at
163-65.
3. See Bob Woodward, The Abortion Papers, Wash. Post, Jan. 22, 1989, at D1, D2.
4. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1185, 1198
(1992) (emphasis added).
5. 1d. at 1208.
6. See David Ga1Tow, History Lesson for the Judge: What Clinton's Supreme Court
Nominee Doesn't Know About !We, Wash. Post, June 20, 1993, at C3 (arguing that
although liberalization forces had scored a series of dramatic breakthroughs between 1967
C)Q~
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departure, not a point of termination, in studying the constitutionality of
abortion. 7
A simple comparison of elected branch interest in abortion before
and after Roe makes clear that the abortion dispute is not controlled by
nine individuals working in isolation. Prior to Roe, abortion was a matter
of some state and limited national attention. In the decade preceding
Roe, after nearly a century of political dormancy, four states repealed and
nineteen states-while still limiting abortion rights-liberalized their
abortion laws. 8 Congress and the White House, for the most part, were
content to leave the abortion issue in the hands of state government:
congressional action was limited and designed to preserve the anti-abortion status quo ante, 9 while executive branch action was equally limited
and typically reaffirmed state authority. to
Elected government action since Roe makes clear that the Supreme
Court's nationalization of abortion rights was anything but the last word
on the subject. Over the past twenty years, the abortion dispute has
spread throughout the American political system. Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey 11 notwithstanding, abortion is hardly the sole
province of the judiciary. While abortion politics and court decision-making are closely linked-especially through the nomination and confirmation of federal judges-the sweep of abortion-related policy is far too
broad for any one branch of government to dominate.
The abortion drama demonstrates that the elected branches can influence the shaping of constitutional values in many ways. The executive
branch has been extremely active in its attempts to regulate abortion.
Presidential appointments to courts and government agencies, the use of
constitutionally specified powers to recommend as well as veto legislation,
and 1970, the emergence of powerful right-to-life forces in 1970 and 1971 resulted in an
all-but-complete deadlock on abortion liberalization in state legislatures).
7. For commentary depicting Roe as the beginning of a dialogue, see Mark Tushnet,
Red, White, and Blue: A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Law 153 (1988); Barry
Friedman, Dialogue andjudicial Review, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 577, 658-68 (1993); see also
Stephen L. Carter, The Morgan "Power" and the Forced Reconsideration of Constitutional
Decisions, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 819, 821-24 (1986) (using Roe to support the argument that
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), permits Congress to engage the Supreme
Court in a dialogue).
8. See Eva R Rubin, Abortion, Politics, and the Courts: Roe v. Wade and Its Mtermath
20-24 (rev. ed. 1987); Austin Sarat, Abortion and the Courts: Uncertain Boundaries of
Law and Politics in American Politics and Public Policy 113, 125-27 (Allan P. Sindler ed.,
1982).
9. By including abortion restrictions in a handful of family planning and healthrelated bills, Congress simply honored 46 states' abortion legislation.
10. In 1971, for example, the Nixon administration restricted the performance of
abortion in military hospitals to bases located in states with legalized abortion. This
episode is discussed in Lee Epstein & Joseph F. Kobylka, The Supreme Court and Legal
Change: Abortion and the Death Penalty 154 (1992).
11. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (affirming right to abortion but replacing trimester
standard with undue burden test).
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and the exercise of symbolic leadership through bully pulpit speeches all
figure prominendy in the abortion dispute. Furthermore, federal departments and agencies involved in health and family planning, civil rights,
foreign policy, and the budget have all found themselves in the midst of
the abortion controversy. 12 Congress and its committees have also been
vigorous players in the abortion dispute. Through its roles both as
lawmaker and overseer of government agencies and departments, Congress is continuously involved in shaping and limiting abortion rights.
Abortion, finally, is not simply about federal decision-making. A vigorous dialogue has emerged between state legislatures and the federal
courts. State legislatures regularly enact, review, and modify laws governing such areas as pre-abortion counseling, waiting periods, and juvenile and spousal rights. 1n conjunction with Congress, the White House,
and the states, interest groups are also actively involved in this political
dynamic. Pro-life forces, for example, played a prominent role in the
election of Ronald Reagan and have been active participants in the crafting of anti-abortion legislation and regulation. 13 Pro-choice forces have
also come to understand the pivotal role played by political action, with
the American Civil Liberties Union and National Abortion Rights Action
League both calling Congress the "'court oflast resort.'" 14
The volume of post-Roe elected branch initiatives is truly remarkable.15 Irrespective of one's views of elected government's efforts, the
abortion dispute clearly provides a revealing glimpse into the workings of
American political institutions. Although elected branch interpretation
figures prominendy in all areas of constitutional decision-making, 16 abor12. These departments and agencies include the Department of Justice, Surgeon
General, National Institutes for Health, Food and Drug Administration, Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, Civil Rights Commission, Department of State,
U.S. Agency for International Development, Department of Defense, Civil Service
Commission, and Office of Management and Budget. The United States' delegation to the
United Nations is also involved in the abortion controversy. See generally infra notes
45-79.
13. See Michele McKeegan, Abortion Politics: Mutiny in the Ranks of the Right 1-46
(1992).
14. Louis Fisher & Neal Devins, Political Dynamics of Constitutional Law 7 (1992)
(quoting from a statement entitled "Supreme Court Alert" which was distributed by the
National Abortion Rights Action League on June 27, 1991); W. John Moore, ln Whose
Court? 23 Nat'IJ. 2396, 2400 (1991) (quoting Leslie A. Harris, chieflegislative counsel in
Washington for the American Civil Liberties Union).
15. Admittedly, since much of abortion politics centers on legislative proposals that
are never enacted and regulatory initiatives that are repealed whenever there is a change
of administration, it is possible to describe abortion politics as a controversy where "[r]arely
have so many public officials worked so hard to say so little about an issue on the minds of
so many citizens." Amy Gutmann, No Common Ground, New Republic, Oct. 22, 1990, at
43, 43 (book review). Nonetheless, although the volume of legislation and regulation
seems disproportionately low in relation to the amount of effort invested, many laws have
been enacted and regulations put into effect.
16. Louis Fisher, Constitutional Dialogues: Interpretation as Political Process 231-74
(1988); See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 1-26; Symposium, Elected Branch
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 295 1994
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tion is indisputably the perfect candidate for a comprehensive examination of the role played by nonjudicial forces in the shaping of
constitutional values.
Political scientists Barbara Hinkson Craig and David M. O'Brien have
recently undertaken this taskP Their Abortion and American Politics is easily the most comprehensive accounting of federal and state abortion politics to date. Remarkable as it may sound, Craig and O'Brien's study is the
first book-length survey of elected branch participation in the abortion
dispute. 18 Other works on this subject have sought either to juggle abortion politics with other concerns or have limited their sights to a select
number of abortion politics topics. 19 Abortion and American Politics therefore addresses a surprisingly large gap in this literature. Craig and
O'Brien's study is also well timed. With Congress, the courts, the Clinton
administration, and the states currently embroiled in a broad range of
abortion disputes, a comprehensive account of this subject is especially
valuable. Furthermore, since the abortion wars have raged for more than
twenty years, conclusions can be drawn about the style and impact of
elected branch participation.
Constitutional Interpretation, 56 Law & Contemp. Probs. (Neal Devins ed., forthcoming
1993).
17. Craig and O'Brien are both well known for studies on the political nature of
constitutional decision-making. Craig's Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional
Struggle (1988) details how political and judicial actors both contributed to the Supreme
Court's legislative veto decision. O'Brien's Storm Center: The Supreme Court in
American Politics (1990) highlights the political nature and inner workings of Supreme
Court decision-making.
18. Eva Rubin's 1987 Abortion, Politics, and the Courts, which examines federal and
state abortion politics both before and after !We, is principally concerned with court
decision-making. Rubin's discussion of the state legislative response to !We, for example,
focuses on post-/We adjudication and not the politics surrounding post-/We legislative
repeal efforts. See Rubin, supra note 8, at 117-49.
19. Abortion politics is typically featured as one of several examples of elected branch
constitutional interpretation. See Susan R. Burgess, Contest for Constitutional Authority:
The Abortion and War Powers Debates (1991); Epstein & Kobylka, supra note 10; Fisher &
Devins, supra note 14; Edward Keynes & Randall K. Miller, The Court vs. Congress: Prayer,
Busing, and Abortion (1989); Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring
About Social Change (1991). Books focusing on the abortion dispute, moreover, have
limited their examination of abortion politics to a period of time or subtopic or have
incorporated their discussion of abortion politics into a broader consideration of the
propriety of !We. See, e.g., The Abortion Dispute and the American System (Gilbert Y.
Steiner ed., 1983) (highly selective compilation which does not systematically consider
Congress, White House, or state role); Marian Faux, Roe v. Wade: The Untold Story of the
Landmark Supreme Court Decision that Made Abortion Legal (1988) (focus on !We case);
Frederick S. Jaffee et al., Abortion Politics: Private Morality and Public Policy (1981)
(focus on abortion as social policy issue); Kristin Luker, Abortion and the Politics of
Motherhood (1984) (focus on interest groups, not elected government action);
McKeegan, supra note 13 (focus on "New Right" attacks on /We);James C. Mohr, Abortion
in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900 (1978) (focus on
nineteenth-century policy development); Laurence H. Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of
Absolutes (1990) (abortion politics balanced with normative concerns).
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 296 1994
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Abortion and American Politics aims high. Recognizing that "the politics of the abortion controversy has affected every branch and every level
of American government" (p. xiii), Craig and O'Brien set out to "use the
abortion controversy as an illustrative portrait, even if in some ways a disappointing reflection, of the American governmental and political process" (p. xv). In unveiling this portrait, Craig and O'Brien steadfastly
refuse to present an argument in support of either side of the abortion
debate. Other than demonstrating that "decisions on highly controversial matters are rarely final" but instead "are subject to challenge, evasion,
and overturning" (pp. xiv-xv), Abortion and American Politics is intended to
be a purely descriptive presentation. Craig and O'Brien opt for this
value-neutral approach so that their conclusions on the American political system will not be tainted by their personal beliefs (p. xv).
In many ways, Abortion and American Politics is highly successful in accomplishing its self-described task. The book is a thorough, accessible,
and even-handed introduction to the multifarious modes through which
elected government at both the state and federal levels has tackled the
abortion issue. The book chronicles, in varying degrees of detail, the
principal initiatives of pro-choice and pro-life forces, including legislative
debates and hearings, court filings and arguments, and regulatory
action. 20
Abortion and American Politics is best viewed as an introduction to
political institutions through the abortion dispute. Chapters are sometimes built around critical players (Congress, the White House, states,
and interest groups) and sometimes around pivotal events (Supreme
Court decisions in Roe, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 21 and Casey).
Craig and O'Brien make good use of this hybrid format. Their recounting offers the benefits of an institutional focus with compelling narrative
force. Abortion and American Politics is unquestionably an important and
valuable addition to the burgeoning literature on the propriety and
sweep of elected branch constitutional interpretation. 22
Despite its many virtues, however, Abortion and American Politics is a
work of limited value. Craig and O'Brien draw no conclusions about
what abortion politics reveals about American political institutions (or,
20. During the period beginning with the !We decision and ending with the election
of Bill Clinton, the bulk of these initiatives were pro-life efforts designed to curtail abortion
rights. Consequently, Abortion and American Politics-which is current up to the first
month or two of the Clinton administration-is principally a book about the reaches and
limits of pro-life attempts to curtail !We v. Wade and its progeny. Pro-choice efforts, for the
most part, are described-as they should be-as attempts to defend !We from pro-life
attacks.
21. 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (approving second trimester viability testing and, with it,
calling into question the !We trimester standard).
22. See sources cited supra notes 7, 16 and 19. See also Ira C. Lupu, Statutes
Revolving in Constitutional Law Orbits, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1 (1993) (analyzing issues raised by
statutes that "utilize the language of the Constitution itself, or ... the language ofjudicial
gloss on the Constitution").
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conversely, what American political institutions tell us about abortion
politics). The authors' sole objective, instead, is to demonstrate that
political actors, as well as courts, shape abortion rights. This proposition
is sufficiently obvious that its proof is hardly groundbreaking. Craig and
O'Brien do not discuss issues such as the quality of elected branch constitutional interpretation, the choice of elected branch responses, the predominance of White House or congressional influences, and elected
branch attitudes toward the judiciary. Consequently, instead of meeting
head on their stated objective of using the abortion controversy to "[understand] the American governmental and political process" (p. xv), the
authors' unwillingness to communicate some lesson beyond a simple recounting of events makes Abortion and American Politics less provocative
and less durable than it might be.
The book, for example, provides no analytical framework with which
to assess the dramatic change in federal abortion politics spurred on by
the advent of the Clinton administration. Prior to Bill Clinton's election,
no administration supported Roe, and most administrations actively opposed it. Today, pro-choice initiatives have moved into the political forefront. Aside from historical background, Abortion and American Politics is
uninstructive in explaining why efforts to enact the Freedom of Choice
Act23 stalled and abortion funding restrictions persist.
The failure of Abortion and American Politics to offer any guidance on
how to assess the factors that affect elected government action, or on the
quality and impact of elected branch constitutional interpretations, is
truly unfortunate. Craig and O'Brien have skillfully amassed an extraordinary amount of information only to place the burden on the
reader to figure out the significance of their facts. This review will attempt to help fill the gap by offering a more cohesive and far-ranging
analysis of the power that governmental institutions wield in shaping
abortion and other constitutional controversies. Part I will follow Craig
and O'Brien's lead and demonstrate how abortion politics illuminates
the numerous ways in which elected government can shape constitutional
values. The examples used, for the most part, will be taken from Abortion
and American Politics. Craig and O'Brien, however, do not seek to bring
together these examples to offer a summary statement on elected branch
influences. Part I serves as such a statement. Part ll will extend the lessons of Abortion and American Politics. Issues considered include the reasons why elected government regularly makes use of some but not all of
its powers to shape constitutional disputes; the seriousness with which the
elected branches engage in constitutional interpretation; the impact of
abortion politics on political institutions; and elected government attitudes toward the judiciary. The Conclusion, finally, will offer some
thoughts on the future of abortion politics.

23. H.R 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 298 1994
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THE RoLE oF ELECTED GoVERNMENT IN SHAPING

CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Each and every feature of the abortion dispute is dominated by
elected government action. Before a case comes to court, Congress or
the states must enact a law or the executive branch must promulgate a
regulation. Once a case is in court, the states, the Justice Department,
and Congressional coalitions-sometimes as parties and sometimes as
amici curiae-inform the judiciary of their views. Mter a case is adjudicated, elected government may seek to expand or limit the holding
through a number of techniques ranging from the interpretation of the
judicial ruling to the nullification of the ruling through constitutional
amendment. Through the appointments-confirmation process, moreover, the President and Senate control the composition of the federal
bench.
Nothing about the above inventory of elected branch influences is
unique to the abortion debate. Issues such as school desegregation, women in the military, fiag burning, war powers, search and seizure, and the
legislative veto follow a similar pattern. 24 What makes governmental conduct in the abortion dispute unique is the intensity of ~lected branch
interest and the resulting evolution of an extraordinary portfolio of legislative-executivejudicial dialogues. Through this portfolio of constitutional dialogues, the abortion dispute serves as a lens through which to
view the political dynamics of constitutional law.
A Elected Government Participation in the Abortion Dispute

1. Congress.- Abortion opponents, according to Craig and O'Brien,
pursued "[v]irtually every possible legislative response" (p. 103) and,
although "able to make significant progress" in stopping federal funding,
were unable to "destroy[]" Roe v. Wade through congressional action (p.
150). Abortion and American Politics offers persuasive evidence to support
this contention.
Congress has repeatedly shied away from taking an absolutist position on abortion. It has rejected a proposed constitutional amendment
overturning Roe as well as human life legislation defining the beginning
of life as conception and specifYing that fetuses are persons for Fourteenth Amendment purposes (pp. 137-45).25 These proposals would
have done more than overturn Roe and return the abortion issue to the
states. The specification of fetuses as legal persons was designed to prevent states from permitting abortions unless the mother's life was in jeopardy. Congress also rejected a more modest "federalism amendment" in
1982 and again in 1983 that would have allowed states to regulate abor24. See sources cited supra notes 7, 16, 19 and 22.
25. See infra notes 117-128 and accompanying text.
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 299 1994
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tion as they saw fit (pp. 146-47).26 Another example of this unwillingness
to endorse extremist positions, although not mentioned in Abortion and
American Politics, is Congress' repudiation of proposals to strip federal
courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, of jurisdiction in abortion
cases.2 7 These proposals would leave state courts free to follow, limit, or
abandon Roe. Of all these measures, only the federalism amendment
made it out of committee, but it was soundly defeated on the Senate floor
(pp. 146-47).
Congress has also rejected pro-choice absolutism. For example, in
the wake of an endorsement in Planned Parenthood v. Casey of a qualified
right to seek an abortion, legislators began backing away from efforts to
codify abortion rights. 28 In addition to pro-life legislators, pro-choice legislators who endorse parental consent and waiting period restrictions appear unwilling to support the codification of Roe through the Freedom of
Choice Act. 29 Notwithstanding the Clinton administration's ostensible
support for these codification efforts,30 the Freedom of Choice Act has
stalled and is unlikely to reemerge in the near future.
Congress, as Craig and O'Brien suggest, is far more inclined to pass
legislation limiting abortion funding than to restrict access to abortion by
more direct means. Starting in 1976 with the Hyde Amendment, Congress has barred the use of Medicaid funds for most abortions (pp.
110-37).31 Congress has also used its appropriations powers to set abortion-related restrictions on programs involving family planning, foreign
aid, legal services, military hospitals, the Bureau of Prisons,32 and the
Peace Corps (pp. 112-13, 131). The use of federal and local funds for
abortions in the District of Columbia has also been limited by Congress
(p. 1_13).
26. SJ. Res. 110, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (a proposed amendment declaring no
constitutional right to abortion and providing that more restrictive state abortion laws
preempt less restrictive federal laws); SJ. Res. 3, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (proposed
amendment declaring no constitutional right to abortion). See infra notes 117-118,
123-126 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 117-119, 123-126, 128. For a thorough description of Congress'
authority to restrict court jurisdiction, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 164-77
(1989).
28. See Julie Rovner, Abortion Ruling Slows Momentum of Freedom of Choice Act,
50 Cong. Q. Wkly. Rep. 1951 (1992).
29. H.R. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); see 1d.
30. See Promises Kept on Abortion Policy, Chi. Trib.,Jan. 26, 1993, at 14; Brian Reilly,
75,000 Protest Clinton's 'VISion': Pro-Lifers Renew Efforts After Pro-Choicer's Election,
Wash. Times, Jan. 23, 1993, at AI.
31. Pub. L. No. 94-439, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976) (applicable for fiscal year 1977). The
precise terms of the Hyde Amendment change from year to year-sometimes allowing for
abortions where the mother's life is in jeopardy, other times providing funds for the
victims of rape and incest, and one year authorizing the funding of abortions when there is
a risk of severe and long-lasting physical health damage to the pregnant woman (p. 124).
Despite its apparent receptiveness to funding prohibitions, Congress has flatly and
repeatedly declined to enact a permanent Hyde Amendment.
32. 132 Cong. Rec. H4583 (daily ed.July 17, 1986).
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Congressional action extends beyond the adoption of funding restrictions and rejection of efforts to overrule &e. Congress has approved
a handful of measures that affect abortion rights outside the context of
federal funding prohibitions. The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 33 both
by defining discrimination on the basis of pregnancy as sex discrimination and providing that employers may exempt abortions from health insurance benefits, lowers the relative cost for a woman to carry her
pregnancy to term. Congress also undertook to encourage alternatives to
abortion in its Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects.34 This
legislation, better known as the "chastity act," enabled religious organizations to seek federal funds to promote sexual abstinence as a method of
birth control among teenagers. Organizations, religious and otherwise,
could not participate in the program if they engaged in abortion
counseling.
Congressional action, however, is not always hostile to abortion
rights. Following the Supreme Court's 1991 approval in Rust v. Sullivan35
of regulations prohibiting federally funded family planning programs
from mentioning abortion, Congress sought to nullify the regulations36
(only to be thwarted by a presidential veto). Craig and O'Brien, while
making note of this episode (pp. 311-15), barely touch on Congress'
power to expand abortion rights. Furthermore, Congress' willingness to
protect abortion rights with legislation appears on the rise. Five months
after Clinton took over the White House, Congress enacted the National
Institutes of Health Revitalization A~t of 1993,37 reversing a Reagan and
Bush era moratorium on federally funded research that uses aborted fetal
tissue. Congress also appears set to enact the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1993,38 nullifying the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in
Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 39 that existing federal civil rights
legislation is not applicable to blockades of abortion clinics by Operation
Rescue and other pro-life groups. Specifically, Freedom of Access legislation would prohibit the use or threat of force against a woman seeking an
abortion or any individual assisting that woman.
33. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076, 2076 (1980) (amending§ 701 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964). Craig and O'Brien refer to this measure in a table of abortion-related
legislation (p. 112), but do not discuss it further.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z-10 (1988). Again, Craig and O'Brien refer to this measure in a
table of abortion-related legislation, but do no more (p. 113). For further discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 107, 110-114.
35. 111 S. Ct.l759, 1771-78 (1991).
36. Characterizing the regulations' denial of "quality health care" to "low income
pregnant women" as "bizarre and cruel," Congress approved a rider prohibiting federal
funding of the regulations. John H. Chafee, Congress Should Remedy the Court's
Decision, Wash. Post, June 7, 1991, at A23.
37. Pub. L. No. 10343, § 113, 107 Stat. 122, 132 (1993); 42 U.S.C.A. § 289(g) (West
Supp. 1993) (banning the use of fetal tissue in research); see infra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text.
38. H.R. 796, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1993).
39. 113 S. Ct. 753, 758-62 (1993).
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Congress also participates in the abortion dispute through the use of
its powers outside of lawmaking. Craig and O'Brien make brief mention
of some of these legislative influences, although they treat these matters
as ancillary to the powers of other branches. Their chapters on presidential politics and post-Webster national politics, for example, refer to the
Senate's role in confirming judicial nominees as part of a presidentially
dominated appointments process (pp. 173--85, 316-21). A larger discussion of interest group participation in Supreme Court litigation (pp. 207,
225) also makes note of congressional participation in litigation. 40
These congressional powers deserve more focused attention. Since
the 1981 nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, the Senate Judiciary Committee has made a nominee's views on abortion the sine qua non of the
confirmation process. This singlemindedness figured largely in the defeat of Robert Bork. More significandy, the fixation of both the Judiciary
Committee and interest groups on the abortion dispute may have contributed to Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter's affirming the "central holding of Roe" in Casey.41
Another phenomenon deserving more focused attention is how Congress seeks to shape constitutional doctrine through its participation in
litigation. When the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
Hyde Amendment in Harris v. McRae, 42 for example, a bipartisan coalition of over 200 congressional amici argned that "[t]o tamper with [the
inviolable and exclusive power of the purse] is to tamper with the very
essence of constitutional, representative government." 43 In recent years,
pro-choice and pro-life legislators have lined up on opposite sides of state
regulation cases. These filings, although principally symbolic, are nonetheless instructive in measuring legislative attitudes. In Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 44 eighty-one pro-choice
legislators publicly scolded Solicitor General Charles Fried for having
"taken an extraordinary and unprecedented step" in calling for Roe's
reversal. 45
40. Through two tables comparing Senators signing "pro-choice" and "anti-abortion"
briefs in 1985 and 1989, Craig and O'Brien adeptly demonstrate how pro-choice legislators
proved much more willing to defend abortion rights when RJJe appeared vulnerable (10 in
1985; 25 ·in 1989), while pro-life legislators' willingness to advocate RJJe's reversal remained
stable (12 in 1985; 15 in 1989) (pp. 207, 225).
41. See Stephen S. Wermeil, Confirming the Constitution, 56 Law & Con temp. Probs.
142 (1993).
42. 448 u.s. 297, 312-20, 321-26 (1980).
43. Brief of Rep. Jim Wright et al. at 14, Harris, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (No. 79-1268)
[hereinafter Brief ofjim Wright].
44. 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (striking down informed consent and reporting requirements
as well as demand that two physicians be present during abortion procedure), overruled in
part by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
45. Brief of Sen. Bob Packwood et al. at 3, Thornburgh, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (No.
84-495).
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 302 1994

1994]

ABORTION AND AMERICAN POLITICS

303

A few aspects of Congress' involvement in the abortion dispute are
not considered in Abortion and American Politics. The confirmation process, of course, extends to executive branch officials as well as Article III
judges. Starting with the Carter administration, presidential appointees
for such positions as Secretary of Health and Human Services, Surgeon
General, Attorney General, Solicitor General, and Director of the Office
of Personnel Management have come to the Senate with a track record
on the abortion issue. The Senate grants the President great leeway in
executive branch appointments. Although the Senate will explore the
nominee's personal views on abortion and how those views will affect her
management of government resources, abortion is not a litmus test issue.
Charles Fried, who had filed a brief calling for Roe's reversal prior to
Reagan's nominating him as Solicitor General, spoke of being "surprised
by how pleasant and interesting the [courtesy call] meetings with the most
liberal Democratic Senators-Kennedy, Metzenbaum, Simon-turned
out to be."46 Nonetheless, the Senate uses these hearings to make nominees well aware of the high-stakes nature of abortion politics. Joseph
Califano, Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare under Carter, put
it this way: "[Following a round of questioning about abortion,] [t] he tension.in the room eased a little as other senators asked questions on Social
Security, balancing the budget, eliminating paperwork, busing, race discrimination, [etc.]."47
Another topic not addressed by Craig and O'Brien is how Congress
participates in the abortion dispute through its oversight of governmental
programs. When the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights published a report
advocating abortion rights in 1975, Congress expressed its displeasure
·with the agency by forbidding future studies on this issue. 48 Congress
likewise used its oversight powers to express its dissatisfaction with the
Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) treatment of Combined Federal Campaign contributions to Planned Parenthood. OPM, then
headed by pro-life activist Donald Devine, excluded Planned Parenthood
from the list of approved charities that federal employees could donate to
through a payroll deduction. Following a series of court decisions, including a Supreme Court decision49 suggesting that the Planned
Parenthood exclusion might well be an impermissible attempt to snuff
out a particular point ofview, Congress enacted legislation in 1985 block-

46. Charles Fried, Order and law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A Firsthand
Account 36 (1991).
47. Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Governing America 59 (1981).
48. See Jaffee et al., supra note 19, at 57. Rather than criticize the substance of the
Commission's arguments, Congress thought the Commission strayed too far from its
statutory mandate in studying abortion rights.
49. See Planned Parenthood Fed'n of America, Inc. v. Devine, No. 83-2118 (D.D.C.
Sept. 14, 1983) (holding that Planned Parenthood could not arbitrarily be excluded from
the Combined Federal Campaign).
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ing the exclusion of advocacy groups from the Combined Federal
Campaign.5°
In addition to the enactment of punitive legislation, congressional
oversight also, and more typically, takes the form of legislative jawboning.
When the Reagan administration suspended fetal tissue research, for example, House Committee on Human Resources chair Ted Weiss requested that the administration turn over all "research evidence" and "all
documents, including letters, memoranda, minutes of meetings, and internal or draft documents. "51 Another example of congressional cajoling
occurred when the Reagan administration announced its proposed regulations on family planning programs. Congressional supporters, including 106 co-signers of a letter of support to Health and Human Services
Secretary Otis Bowen, encouraged the administration to stick to its guns
and promulgate the regulations in final form. 52 Opponents, in contrast,
pleaded with the administration to suspend the regulations, accusing the
administration of"succumb[ing] to political pressure" and describing the
proposal as "not in the best interest of the 5,000,000 low income people
that depend upon the program each year for family planning services."53
2. The President. - The preeminence of the abortion issue in presidential politics is tellingly revealed by the remarkable speed and vigor
with which the Clinton administration put its pro-choice policies into effect. Having made campaign pledges to work for the enactment of the
Freedom of Choice Act5 4 and to appoint federal judges "who believe ...
[in] the constitutional right to privacy and the right to choose,"55 Clinton
wasted little time in waving the pro-choice banner. On january 22, 1993,
two days after his inauguration, Clinton dismantled the pro-life regulatory initiatives of the Reagan and Bush administrations. Speaking of our
national "[goal] to protect individual freedom" and his vision "of an
America where abortion is safe and legal, but rare," Clinton directed his
Secretaries of Health and Human Services and Defense as well as the Administrators of the Food and Drug Administration and U.S. Agency for
International Development (AID) to rescind existing anti-abortion regulations.56 As a result, the ban on fetal tissue research was lifted, limits on
50. See 132 Cong. Rec. H2054 (daily ed. Apr. 22, 1986) (debate on supplemental
appropriations of fiscal year 1986); McKeegan, supra note 13, at 48-52.
51. Letter from Ted Weiss, Chairman, Human Resources and Intergovernmental
Relations Subcommittee of the United States House of Representatives, to Louis Sullivan,
M.D., Secretary, Department of Health and Human Resources (Nov. 13, 1989) (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
52. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 223.
53. Letter from Sen. Edward Kennedy to Otis Bowen, Secretary, of Health and
Human Services (Oct. 30, 1987) (on file with the author).
54. H.R 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess (1991).
55. Prime Time Live (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 29, 1992) (transcript on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
56. Remarks on Signing Memorandums on Medical Research and Reproductive
Health and an Exchange with Reporters, 29 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 85 Qan. 25, 1993).
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the ability of family planning programs to mention abortion were suspended, privately funded abortions at military hospitals were permitted,
the moratorium on the importation of the abortifacient RU-486 \vas suspended, and limitations on the use of private funds by pro-choice organizations that also receive AID funds were suspended.57 In the first six
months of his administration, moreover, Clinton advanced his pro-choice
agenda through legislative initiatives, court filings, and judicial appointments. During this time, Clinton supported abortion coverage in his national health care package and proposed a budget that did not include
the Hyde Amendment and other abortion funding prohibitions.5 8 In addition to supporting the Freedom of Choice Act, Clinton also stood behind legislative efforts to guarantee access to abortion clinics and to fetal
tissue for research. On the judicial front, Clinton told reporters that he
had settled on Ruth Bader Ginsburg as his Supreme Court nominee "after he became convinced that she was 'clearly prochoice.'"59 Finally,
before the Supreme Court, Clinton's Solicitor General argued that federal racketeering laws apply to the activities of Operation Rescue. 60
The range and ferocity of Clinton administration action makes clear
that the White House can be an active and somewhat one-sided participant in all phases of the abortion dispute. Focusing on Reagan administration initiatives, Abortion and American Politics reaches the same
conclusion. Pointing to Reagan's efforts to advance his pro-life agenda
through spiritual leadership, regulatory reform, judicial appointments
and arguments, and legislative and constitutional amendment proposals,
Craig and O'Brien argue that "the Reagan administration not only fundamentally changed the national debate over abortion but set the stage for
how the controversy will play out in the 1990s" (p. 157).
Before the election of Ronald Reagan, abortion was an important
but not front burner issue for the executive. Prior to Roe, the White
House saw abortion as a states' rights issue and left it alone. In the 1972
election, for example, Richard Nixon spoke of"abortion [as] an unacceptable form of population control" (p. 158), but proposed no federal action, while George McGovern made clear that he had "never advocated
federal action to repeal [abortion] laws" and that, if elected, he "would
take no such action" (p. 159). Mter Roe, abortion was too much on the
national political agenda to be dismissed by the White House. The Ford
administration, for example, could not help but confront questions regarding the eligibility of abortion under federal health care programs. In
57. See id. at 85-86.
58. See Stephen Barr, Abortion Coverage Proposed, Wash. Post, Apr. 6, 1993, atA-1.
Clinton also proposed to allow federal employee health insurance plans to cover abortions.
See id.
59. Michael Kranish & Joel P. Engardio, Clinton Defends Methods, Boston Globe,
June 16, 1993, § 3, at 1.
60. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Nat'l Org. of Women v.
Scheidler, (No. 92-780) (cert. granted June 14, 1993) (case pending) (interfering with
abortion clinics does not violate RICO).
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the 1976 election, moreover, Ford and Carter both sought out the Catholic electorate by opposing public funding of abortion. 61 When Carter was
elected, he justified the disproportionate burden that poor women suffer
under the Hyde Amendment by observing that "there are many things in
life that are not fair, that wealthy people can afford and poor people
can't. "62 Neither Carter nor Ford played an activist role in the abortion
dispute, however. Abortion did not figure prominently in their judicial
appointments; neither asked the courts to either affirm or disavow Rne;
legislation and constitutional amendments were not proposed; and regulatory initiatives were modest in scope and sweep.
The 1980 election of Ronald Reagan changed all that. Indeed, to
understand the range of options available to the executive one cannot
help but focus-as Craig and O'Brien do-on the Reagan administration. Reagan campaigned on a platform that "support[ed] a constitutional amendment to restore protection of the right to life for unborn
children" and "support[ed] ... the Congressional efforts to restrict the
use of taxpayers' dollars for abortion. "63 Once in office, as Reagan Solicitor General Charles Fried put it, "[t]he Reagan administration made Rne
v. Wade the symbol of everything that had gone wrong in law, particularly
in constitutionallaw." 64 In Reagan's view, Rne v. Wade was as divisive and
as wrong as Dred Scott. 65
Reagan, as Craig and O'Brien note, was generally ineffective in his
efforts to push through a pro-life legislative agenda (p. 172). With or
without White House cheerleading, Congress was unwilling to approve a
constitutional amendment restricting abortion rights, to enact a permanent Hyde amendment, to prohibit federally funded family planning centers from referring pregnant women for abortions, or to statutorily define
a fetus as a legal person. While the President was not able to push his
legislative agenda through a reluctant Congress, Reagan effectively advanced his pro-life agenda on matters squarely within the executive's domain-judicial and administrative appointments, court filings,
regnlation, and the power to veto or to approve legislation enacted by the
Congress.
Court filings and judicial appointments are the most direct ways by
which the executive seeks to shape constitutional law and, not surprisingly, Craig and O'Brien focus their efforts here. Reagan and his appointees spoke ofjudicial restraint and vigorously opposed "court create[d]"
61. See Tribe, supra note 19, at 147-50.
62. President's News Conference of July 12, 1977, Pub. Papers, 1977 (II}, at 1237.
63. 1980 Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 36 Cong. Q. Almanac 58-B, 62-B
(1980).
64. Fried, supra note 45, at 72.
65. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (holding that a Black
American is not a citizen of a state as "citizen" is used in the federal constitution). On this
point, see Reagan's remarkable Human Life Review article reprinted in Ronald Reagan,
Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation 15 (1984).
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privacy rights. 66 In advancing this judicial philosophy, the administration
clearly heeded pro-life Senators and interest group concerns and, arguably, gave these groups a veto over prospective nominees (p. 175). This
strategy, more importantly, worked: "Reagan appointees were much
more resistant to abortion rights than were the appointees of his predecessors."67 The Reagan administration also advanced its judicial philosophy through briefs and oral arguments before the lower federal courts
and the Supreme Court (pp. 185-87). In many instances, the administration defended its regulatory agenda in court. In some instances (typically
before the Supreme CoUrt), the administration appeared as an amicus to
inform the Court of its views on state authority to regulate abortion.
Reagan's first term Solicitor General Rex Lee, although falling short of
asking the Court to overturn Roe, suggested that the Justices replace the
trimester test with a more lenient undue burden standard. 68 Reagan's
second term Solicitor General Charles Fried took the plunge and argued
that Roe was "'so far flawed and ... a source of such instability"' that it
should be overturned (p. 186).69
The Reagan administration also reshaped abortion rights through its
management of the administrative state. Abortion and American Politics discusses the most controversial of these regulatory initiatives, namely, the
so-called "gag rule" ultimately upheld in Rust v. Sullivan.70 The story begins in 1970 when Congress added to Title X a comprehensive family
planning statute, an explicit prohibition against appropriating funds
"where abortion is a method of family planning. "71 The Carter administration interpreted the funding ban narrowly, mandating that Title X recipients provide "non-directive counseling" on "pregnancy
termination. "72 The Reagan administration vehemently opposed these
66. According to his Assistant Attorney General in charge of judicial selections,
Stephen Markman, "Reagan would have been derelict of his constitutional duty if he were
to have appointed judges who were willing to create new constitutional 'rights' out of thin
air." Stephen J. Markman, Judicial Selection: The Reagan Years, in Judicial Selection:
Merit, Ideology, and Politics 33 (Henry Julian Abraham ed., 1990).
67. Steve Alumbaugh & C. K. Rowland, The Links Between Platform-Based
Appointment Criteria and Trial Judges' Abortion Judgments, 74 Judicature 153, 162
(1990).
68. On the trimester test, see supra note 2. The undue burden standard would
approve state regulation of abortion that does not place an "undue burden" on a woman's
decision to terminate her preguancy. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae,
City of Akron v. Akron Ct:r. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) (No. 81-746).
For further discussion, see infra note 153.
69. Fried advanced this argument in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986). (pp. 186-87).
70. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
71. Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of1970, Title X,§ 1008, 84
Stat. 1504, 1508 (1970).
72. Program Guidelines for Project Grants for Family Planning Services, U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Services, Part II, 8.6 at 13 (1981).
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regulations and ultimately elected to override the Carter scheme through
its own regulatory initiatives. 7 3
The Supreme Court approved the Reagan scheme because "substantial deference is accorded" to the executive in its interpretation of statutes. 7 4 Craig and O'Brien discuss Rust but do not consider its
implications (pp. 311-12, 331-32). As the varying approaches of the
Carter and Reagan administrations reveal, the executive has broad latitude in filling the gaps of statutory language. Moreover, as Congress'
failed attempt to statutorily overrule the gag order suggests, it may well
take a two-thirds supermajority for Congress to trump the regulatory initiatives of the executive. The Reagan-and later the Bush-administration made good use of this regulatory authority to advance its pro-life
agenda. Policies on fetal tissue research, U.S. AID grant recipients, the
importation of RU-486, and the permissibility of abortions in military hospitals were all promulgated pursuant to the executive's authority to implement the laws.
The effective exercise of rule-making authority requires the President to appoint like-minded individuals to administer abortion-related
programs. Abortion and American Politics, however, does not take into account how the Reagan White House made use of its appointments authority. To start, Reagan's regulatory appointees, according to political
scientists George Eads and Mike Fix, were "selected for their symbolic
value rather than their administrative skills" and "there was no appreciable fear of the damage controversial appointees could generate."75 On
abortion-related issues, not surprisingly, a number of Reagan appointees
came from the Right-to-Life movement: OPM head Donald Devine had
run the Life Amendment Political Action Committee; Centers for Disease
Control director James Mason had opposed abortion rights as head of
Utah's state health department; Health and Human Services secretary
Richard Schweiker had, as a U.S. Senator, sponsored a constitutional
amendment to overturn Roe; Title X family planning program head
Maxjory Mecklenburg was a founder of the National Right to Life Committee and her eventual successor Jo Ann Gasper had been editor of the
Right Woman; and Surgeon General C. Everett Koop had written and lectured against abortion. 76 The Reagan administration also made opposi73. The Reagan administration had earlier (and unsuccessfully) proposed legislation
to prohibit Title X recipients from discussing abortion as a family planning alternative (p.
188).
74. Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1767.
75. George C. Eads & Michael Fix, Relief or Reform: Reagan's Regulatory Dilemma
143 (1984).
76. See McKeegan, supra note 13, at 48 (Donald Devine, Director of Office of
Personnel Management), 53 (Dr. James Mason, Director of Centers for Disease Control),
66 (Richard Schweicker, Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services), 67
(Mrujory Mecklenburg, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Population Affairs), 114 Uo Ann
Gasper, succeeded Mecklenburg), 121 (C. Everett Koop, Surgeon General). Although her
biographical background on these Reagan appointees is accurate, it should be noted that
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tion to abortion a litmus test for key government posts. Charles Fried's
nomination for Solicitor General, for example, hinged on his willingness,
as Acting Solicitor General, to ask the Supreme Court to overturn Roe. 7 7
This policy cohesiveness stands in sharp contrast to the Carter administration where top Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) appointees participated in a meeting organized by White House advisor Midge Costanza to
protest against Carter and his HEW Secretary Joseph Califano's opposition to federal funding of abortion. 78 Reagan administration policy cohesiveness also helps explain the effectiveness of Reagan's regulatory
campaign against abortion.
Another significant presidential weapon not seriously considered by
Craig and O'Brien is the veto power. The veto power, as the experiences
of the Bush administration demonstrate, can be used in two ways. First,
the President can block congressionally supported programs that he disfavors. Bush's veto of legislative efforts to reinstate fetal tissue research
and suspend the gag rule fits this category.79 Second, the veto power can
sometimes be used to force Congress to adopt a presidentially supported
program. This is precisely what occurred when Congress refused to reenact a 1989 provision of the D.C. spending bill prohibiting the expenditure of both federal and city funds to pay for abortions.80 Bush vetoed
the bill and demanded that Congress reinsert the city funding prohibition. Recognizing the necessity of passing a spending bill and failing to
override the Bush veto, Congress ultimately capitulated and reinserted
the prohibition of both federal and city abortion expenditures.
3. The States. - The states are as prominent as the federal government in shaping the abortion dispute. Prior to Roe v. Wade, abortion battles were the near exclusive province of the states. Since Rne, as Craig and
O'Brien argue, the states have been afforded and have taken advantage
of "multiple opportunities for thwarting compliance with, or implementation of [Roe]" (p. 77). With recent decisions like Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services81 and Planned Parenthood v. Casrry82 acknowledging broad
state authority to regulate (although not prohibit) abortion, the scope of
abortion rights seems to hinge on state politics.
Abortion and American Politics explains the pivotal role played by state
actors in this constitutional dynamic. State responses to Roe (pp. 78-100)
as well as state politics after Webster (pp. 279-303) are considered sepaMcKeegan's book is the work of an advocate hostile to Reagan's "New Right" anti-abortion
agenda.
77. See Stephen Wermeil, Reagan Names Fried to Become Solicitor General, Wall St.
]., Sept. 26, 1985, at 64.
78. See Califano, supra note 46, at 65.
79. On the gag rule, see 137 Cong. Rec. H10,491, Nov. 19, 1991 (daily ed.). On fetal
tissue, see Pub. Papers 1992-93 (1), at 1005.
80. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 235-37.
81. 492 u.s. 490 (1989).
82. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 309 1994

310

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:293

rately and at length. State politics before Rne is also examined, but not in
any detail (pp. 73-78).
Rne v. Wade, although setting in motion the contemporary abortion
dispute, did not appear in a political vacuum. Actions in the 1960s by the
American Law Institute, American Medical Association, and various religious organizations spurred nineteen states to liberalize their criminal
statutes governing abortion (p. 74). Of equal significance, only three
states (Louisiana, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania) prohibited all abortions
(p. 74). In the early 1970s, although thirty-four states had rejected reform initiatives,83 more dramatic change seemed possible. The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted a Uniform
Abortion Act, which would have placed no limitations on abortion during
the first twenty weeks of pregnancy.s4
The Court in Rne sought to ride the crest of these reform efforts.
State responses to Rne, however, reveal that the nation was not prepared
to accept the Court's decision. Indeed, in the year following Rne, 260 bills
aimed at restricting abortion rights were introduced and thirty-nine were
enacted (p. 77). Moreover, by turning abortion rights advocates' principal objective into a constitutional mandate, reform efforts became the
province of groups seeking to chip away at, if not destroy, Rne.
Anti-abortion interest groups had huge success. From 1973 to 1989,
306 abortion measures were passed by forty-eight states. The principal
weapons of Rne's opponents were attempts to make abortion less attractive through so-called "burden creation" strategies. These strategies included increasing the risks of undergoing an abortion (statutes
forbidding a safe abortion method-saline amniocentesis-while permitting more dangerous abortion techniques); reducing accessibility to medical facilities that perform abortions (statutes demanding that all
abortions be performed in a hospital and zoning laws restricting the
number of abortion clinics); jncreasing the cost of abortions (statutes requiring pathologist or other physician involvement in abortion procedures); and establishing detailed pre-abortion procedures (statutes
requiring women to be informed of the "medical risks" of abortion and to
wait at least twenty-four hours after consenting to the abortion
procedure). 8 5
Abortion and American Politics expertly details this first wave of state
resistance to Rne. Through sections on health regulations, public funding, advertising, fetal protection, and parental consent and notification,
Craig and O'Brien nicely summarize the various categories of post-Rne
83. See Lynn D. Wardle & Mary Anne Q. Wood, A Lawyer Looks at Abortion 43
(1982).
84. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 234.
85. See Albert M. Pearson & Paul M. Kurtz, The Abortion Controversy: A Study in
Law and Politics, 8 Harv.J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 427, 433-34 (1985). For an alternative typology,
see Rubin, supra note 8, at 127-30 (describing seven types of abortion·related legislation
·
enacted immediately after &e).
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regulation and the states that supported those regulations (pp. 78-94).
This accounting reveals the obvious, namely, that "[t]he price of preserving diversity in the states ... comes at the cost of nationally uniform laws"
(p. 94).86
Just as Rne transformed state abortion politics in 1973, the Court's
1989 Webster decision signaled a new era in abortion politics. On the
brink of overturning Rne, the Court declared "the rigid Rne framework"
unworkable and opened the door to anti-abortion legislation by approving, among other things, second trimester fetal viability tests.s7 In the
days following Webster, pro-choice and pro-life interest groups predicted
an avalanche of anti-abortion legislation.sa
Webster did not live up to its interest group billing. From 1989 to
1992, only fourteen statutes were enacted; nine pro-choice and five prolife (p. 282). This paucity of enacted bills prompted the Alan Gutmacher
Institute to conclude that "[t]he wholesale changes in abortion law that
had been widely predicted by activists, political pundits and the media
[are yet to occur. Instead,] ... law makers [have] stayed in the 'safe,'
familiar, middle ground."89 Craig and O'Brien reach a similar conclusion and glean from the mixed results and modest volume of legislative
output that there are now "uvo powerful, determined, and politically active forces-one on each side of the abortion issue-and caught in the
middle [are] the state politicians" (p. 299).
This conclusion is hardly groundbreaking, but it goes a long way toward explaining the events of the past few years. It explains, for example,
that legislative inertia can be a measure of a decision's impact. It also
suggests that pro-choice interests are politically dominant in states that
protect abortion rights and, correspondingly, that pro-life interests are
dominant in states that enact anti-abortion measures. Otherwise, prochoice interests would have enough clout to kill off pro-life initiatives and
vice versa. Craig and O'Brien recoguize the role of interest group pressure but also point to other factors that explain legislative decision-making such as the nature of competing issues, the demographics of the
population, and the perspectives of key legislators as well as the governor
(p. 283).
86. Craig and O'Brien never discuss whether uniformity in abortion legislation is a
value worth pursuing and consequently provide no guidance on whether the "cost" of
sacrificing uniformity is a matter of consequence.
87. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 518-19 (1989).
88. Representative Chris Smith, Chair of the Congressional Pro-Life Caucus, beamed
that Webster would "lead to the enactment of state laws" and the "saving of many children."
Planned Parenthood Press Conference, Fed. News Serv., July 3, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File. Kate Michelman, Executive Director of National Abortion
Rights Action League, warned that "[w]omen's lives hang by a thread, and the Justices this
morning handed the state politicians a pair of scissors." Id.
89. The Alan Gutmacher Inst., State Reproductive Health Monitor: Legislative
Proposals and Actions, December 1990 at i.
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A factor not considered by Craig and O'Brien in their assessment of
state abortion politics is the often pivotal role played by state court
judges. Before Rne, several state courts struck dovm anti-abortion laws. 90
Mter the Supreme Court concluded in Harris v. McRaen that a congressional prohibition on the use of Medicaid funds for abortions did not
Violate the Equal Protection Clause, courts in California, Connecticut,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and Oregon interpreted their ovm
constitutions to protect the right of indigent women to a state-funded
abortion. The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed out that "state Constitutions are separate sources of individual freedoms and restrictions on
the exercise of power by the Legislature. . . . Although the state Constitution may encompass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, our
constellation of rights may be more complete. "92
Ten states' constitutions contain explicit privacy provisions and several others contain clauses that have been interpreted to protect the right
to privacy. Some state courts have applied these provisions to protect
abortion rights. For example, the California Supreme Court ruled that
"the federal right of privacy ... is more limited than the corresponding
right in the California Constitution" and that restrictions on abortion
funding for indigent women therefore violated California's explicit privacy right. 93
Victories in state court, moreover, do not end the political struggle.
Instead, the state legislature and voters engage state courts in a dialogue
over the meaning of the state constitution. Take the case of California.
In 1981, the California Supreme Court declared that the legislature could
not restrict state funding for abortions for indigent women, but in each
of the last ten years the legislature passed laws restricting the funding.
Each year the courts struck down the laws and reinstated the funding. 94
Conservatives attempted to make use of the ballot box to remove liberal
judges. California Chief Justice Rose Elizabeth Bird and two other justices were ousted in 1986 when conservatives targeted them for electoral
defeat. A five-two conservative m~ority now dominates the court, but it
90. See Survey of Abortion Law, 1980 Ariz. St. LJ. 67, 106-11. See also Rubin, supra
note 8, at 31-57 (chronicling Court opinions leading up to Roe).
91. 448 u.s. 297, 299 (1980).
92. Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 931 (NJ. 1982) (citations omitted).
93. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 796 (Cal.
1981). Following Webster, pro-choice groups scored impressive court victories in California
and Florida. See American Academy of Pediatrics v. Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. 46, 55
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (Affirming grant of an injunction preventing implementation of a hili
that would prevent unemancipated minors from having abortions without parental
consent); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla. 1989) (holding that a statute that requires
parental consent of judicial bypass for minors seeking an abortion unconstitutionally
intrudes on the privacy rights of pregnant minors).
94. See, e.g., Philip Hager, Court Again Rejects Curbs on Abortions, L.A. Times, Nov.
17, 1989, at A3.
HeinOnline -- 94 Colum. L. Rev. 312 1994

1994]

ABORTION AND AMERICAN POliTICS

313

continues to issue an expansive interpretation of California's privacy
right. 95
Webster and Casey, by substituting an "undue burden" test for Roe's
trimester standard, have made state politics the fulcrum of the abortion
dispute. Prior to Webster, Roe and its progeny left little room for significant state regulation. That state legislators were activists during this Roe
to Webster period yet are extraordinarily cautious today says a good deal
about state attitudes both toward abortions and toward the Supreme
Court. Abortion and American Politics does not address this issue; instead, it
simply concludes that "[h]ow the battles in the states shape up, and
whether and what kinds of new restrictions on abortion emerge depend
on the politics of each state" (p. 349).

B. On Constitutional Diawgues and the Abortion Dispute
The abortion dispute reveals that the shaping of constitutional values
is a dynamic process in which the courts, the executive, and the legislature engage in a dialogue with each other at both the federal and state
level. The Supreme Court has moderated Roe's stringent trimester standard thanks to presidentially nominated and Senate confirmed judicial
appointments, amicus filings by the Solicitor General and congressional
groups, and state legislators whose willingness to legislatively challenge
Roe created repeated opportunities for the Court to fine-tune its abortion
doctrine. With Webster and Casey, the Court recognized that state legislatures and courts will likely play the pivotal role in defining the reaches
and limits of abortion rights.
Congress and the White House have also shaped abortion rights and
participated in a dialogue with the courts and each other through legislative enactments and administrative rule-making. Congress puts into law a
vision of constitutional meaning whenever it enacts abortion-related legislation; the executive likewise participates in these matters through the
President's signing of this legislation and the Justice Department's defense of these measures; the courts, finally, adjudicate constitutional challenges to these enactments. Administrative rule-making follows a similar
interactive course-agency heads engage in constitutional interpretation
when promulgating regulations. The executive, moreover, defends these
regulations in court and fends off congressional attacks through testimony, and if need be, the veto power. Congress also participates in rulemaking through its confirmation of agency heads, oversight of government programs, amici filings in court, and occasionally through legislation to moderate disfavored initiatives. Finally, the courts have entered
the fray through decisions concerning the scope of executive power to
interpret vague statutory language.
95. See Van de Kamp, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 46.
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This dynamic is pervasive. 96 It clearly shows the judiciary to be one
part of a constitutional dialogue that involves all of government. Abortion
and American Politics, despite hinging its argument on constitutional decision-making being much more than pronouncements of the Supreme
Court, does not speak of this dialogue. Craig and O'Brien certainly describe the numerous initiatives of Congress, the President, and the states.
What they do not do is explain how the actions of one branch interface
with the actions of another. Abortion and American Politics sees each event
as a snapshot; that these interacting events form a mosaic is not revealed
by Craig and O'Brien. Consequently, the story they tell is interesting but
less interesting than it could be, and their depiction of constitutional decision-making is accurate but less accurate than it could be.
Abortion and American Politics would also benefit if it approached nonjudicial influences in a more systematic fashion. Congress, the executive,
and the states all make use of different types of powers at different moments (before judicial action, during a<ljudication, and after judicial action). In understanding elected branch influences, it is important to
know what these powers are and when they are used. Craig and O'Brien,
although describing the most significant episodes of elected branch involvement, never connect these critical episodes to a fuller description of
what techniques are used by elected government and when they will be
used. In addition, by focusing their efforts on critical episodes, there are
some gaps in their coverage of the techniques of elected branch influences. Congressional oversight of agency enforcement, the veto power,
and the appointment and confirmation of agency officials are important
topics that go virtually unnoticed in Abortion and American Politics.
Craig and O'Brien understate how nuanced and how complex
elected branch action is by failing to delineate systematically nonjudicial
influences. Take the case of the Reagan-Bush federal family planning
rules. By discussing the promulgation (pp. 188-90), judicial approval
(pp. 331-32), and repeal of these rules (p. 358) as three discrete events,
Craig and O'Brien provide few insights into the ways in which all three
branches may play off one another. For example, Congress' 1991 efforts
to statutorily override family planning regulations were intended to express dissatisfaction with the executive for promulgating the order and
the courts for upholding it.
These criticisms of Abortion and American Politics should not be overstated. Craig and O'Brien's account is cogent and detailed. Indeed, with
a little diligence, the reader can piece together what powers the various
branches possess and when they are likely to exercise those powers.
Nonetheless, by placing the onus of interpretive responsibility squarely
with the reader, Craig and O'Brien dilute their central claim about the
pervasiveness of elected government action.
96. See sources cited supra notes 8, 16, 19 and 22.
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ABORTION AND ELECTED BRANCH INTERPRETATION CONSIDERED:

EXTENDING ABORTION AND AME.RrCAN POLITICS

The abortion dispute reveals a great deal about the American governmental and political processes. "[T] hat [Supreme Court] decisions on
highly controversial matters are rarely final" (pp. xiv-xv) is the lesson that
Craig and O'Brien glean from their examin!ltion of state and federal
abortion politics. A modest extension of Craig and O'Brien's assessment,
as Part I demonstrates, reveals that constitutional values are shaped by a
highly interactive dynamic that involves repeated volleys between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of both state and federal government. Craig and O'Brien, however, leave unexamined numerous issues
critical to an understanding of elected branch constitutional interpretation as well as abortion's impact on the governmental process. This section will extend Abortion and American Politics by examining four of these
issues: the reasons why elected government regularly makes use of some
but not all of its powers to shape constitutional disputes; the seriousness
with which elected government approaches constitutional issues; the impact of single issue politics on political institutions; and elected government attitudes towards the judiciary. Although these issues never surface
in Abortion and American Politics, they all lurk in the background of the
events recounted by Craig and O'Brien. Consequently, while this section
will extend Abortion and American Politics, it will principally rely on episodes discussed in the book.

A Elected Government's Choice of Response
Patterns of congressional and White House responses to Roe have
emerged over the past twenty years. Congressional opposition to Roe has
been principally expressed in funding prohibitions, many of which must
be reenacted every year. Constitutional amendments, court-stripping,
and statutory repeal have been rejected. When Congress acts to support
abortion rights, moreover, it typically acts to rein in either the executive
for a regulation which it disapproves or the courts for a statutory interpretation it disfavors. Constitutional amendments or statutory language asserting the correctness of Roe have been eschewed. Since Ronald
Reagan's 1980 election, the presidency has made use of all the weapons
available to it to advance its pro-choice or pro-life positions. Judicial and
administrative appointments, legislative initiatives, the veto power, rulemaking, and the bully pulpit head the list of these presidential tools.
Congress' mixed approach and its heavy reliance on appropriationsbased policymaking are quite understandable. Appropriations measures
are preferred over constitutional amendment and direct statutory repeals
because they are easier to enact.97 Take the case of the Hyde Amendment. Anti-abortion forces, unable to get statutory and constitutional
97. See Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation
Riders, 1987 Duke LJ. 456, 456-59.
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amendment proposals out of committee, turned their attention to the
subterranean world of appropriations-based policymaking. Appropriations measures must be enacted every year, and anti-abortion forces,
through a simple floor amendment, were able to compel a majority up or
down vote on Medicaid funding. That Congress would approve such a
funding ban is hardly surprising. A funding ban leaves the right intact
and hence appears to be a moderate response. Congress' decision not to
finance an activity which many find morally reprehensible does not necessarily call into question the correctness of Roe; instead, the decision not to
appropriate is part and parcel of Congress' power of the purse. It is also a
decision-because of the single year nature of appropriations-with a
limited shelf life and great opportunity for fine tuning. Direct legislative
repeals, in contrast, are uncompromising and consequently, the political
costs of supporting such measures are great
Congress' pro-abortion decision-making follows a similar pattern.
Direct affirmations of Roe, such as the proposed Freedom of Choice Act
of 1989,98 have been rejected. Congress instead limits its pro-choice activity to decision-making that does not explicitly reaffirm Roe. Legislation to
restore fetal tissue research and to allow family planning centers to discuss abortion were designed to check an overly aggressive executive. This
is a classic exercise of Congress' oversight authority. Along the same
lines, were Congress to enact abortion clinic access legislation in response
to the Supreme Court's Bray decision, 99 Congress would simply be checking what it perceived as the Court's misinterpretation of statutory language.100 In both instances, Congress would be playing a reactive role
where decisional costs were kept to a minimum.
On issues as divisive as abortion, Congress has strong incentives not
to prompt the ire of losers by making decisions that are too final. In
addition to the desire of many members of Congress to avoid decisional
costs, the failure of absolutist approaches is also attributable to Congress'
structure. Because Congress only acts collectively, pro-choice and pro-life
members of Congress who adopt extreme views and want to exercise Congress' power in a forceful manner often cancel each other out
Congress' reluctance to embrace a substantive theory of abortion
rights is also evidenced in legislative filings before the courts. In cases
calling into question the correctness and scope of abortion rights, coali98. S. 1912, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (prohibiting states from restricting the right
of a woman to choose abortion prior to fetal viability except when necessary to protect the
woman's life).
99. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (holding that Ku
Klux Klan Act does not apply to Operation Rescue Protestors blockading abortion clinics).
100. Congress likewise responded to the Court's perceived misinterpretation of
employment discrimination statutes when it enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act,
Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1980) (amending§ 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
Specifically, Congress disapproved of Supreme Court decisions upholding state and private
exclusion of pregnancy-related costs from health care coverage. See General Elec. Co. v.
Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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tions of pro-choice and pro-life congressional amici file competing briefs
before the Court. 101 Bipartisan congressional support is more likelyalthough far from a sure thing-in cases that implicate legislative powers.
For example, when the Supreme Court adjudicated the constitutionality
of the Hyde Amendment, 102 a bipartisan coalition of pro-choice and prolife legislators advanced a broad interpretation of Congress' appropriations power. 103
White House decision-making, on the other hand, has been calibrated differently from that of Congress. Rather than only playing a reactive role, Reagan, Bush, and Clinton have been activists. Reagan's antiabortion speeches and regulatory agenda, Bush's defense of that agenda
in court and through the veto, and Clinton's immediate dismantling of
Reagan-Bush programs exemplify the White House's commitment to vigorous and strident leadership on the abortion question. 104 This activism-like Congress' decision to minimize decisional costs-is pragmatic.
Unwilling to alienate both pro-choice and pro-life interests with a Carteresque middle ground strategy, the White House aligns itself with one or
the other set of interest groups in the abortion dispute.
Starting with the 1980 election of Ronald Reagan, for example, every
President has subscribed to a substantive theory of abortion rights and
has been willing to back up that theory with Supreme Court filings and
arguments. While the theories of pro-choice and pro-life administrations
are incompatible with each other, the singular nature of the presidency
apparently demands that the executive embrace one or the other theory.
On questions of presidential authority, moreover, pro-choice and pro-life
administrations have advanced similar arguments. The Reagan, Bush,
and Clinton administrations, among other things, have endorsed broad
executive branch authority to interpret vague legislative mandates. 105
Congress' tendency to be reactive and diffuse as well as the competing executive tendency to endorse one or the other side are critically important factors in understanding the abortion dispute. By the same
token, an examination of the abortion dispute helps explain other factors
101. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
102. Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
103. See Brief of jim Wright, supra note 42.
104. The President has broad authority to advance his policy initiatives as part of his
constitutional responsibility to execute the law. See Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins,
Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enforcement of
Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 203, 219-28 (1987). For
example, it is inappropriate for any administration to make use of judicially approved
consent decrees to bind its successors to its policy preferences. See id. at 227-28. With
respect to abortion-related regulations, the Clinton administration was in no way legally or
morally bound by Reagan-Bush initiatives just as the Reagan administration was not bound
by Carter-era interpretations.
105. See supra notes 54-59, 69-73, 78 and accompanying text (discussing how Reagan
promulgated, Bush defended, and Clinton repealed regulations governing the mentioning
of abortion by federally funded family planning centers).
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that motivate both the White House and Congress. Specifically, by utilizing all of his powers, the President has maximized his influence in shaping the tone of the abortion debate vis-a-vis Congress. On regulatory
matters, for example, the executive has hardly been confined by the
broader boundaries of the legislation which Congress enacted. Initiatives
on fetal tissue research, family planning counseling, and the like suggest
that executive branch authority is catapulted by broadly stated legislative
mandates. Craig and O'Brien, who use the abortion dispute to ''vividly
illustrate how our political institutions actually operate" (p. xiii) would
have been well served by considering the institutional tugs and pulls that
help explain elected government decision-making.
B. The Seriousness Wzth Which Elected Branches Undertake Interpretation

Does elected government take seriously its responsibility as constitutional interpreter?106 After all, lawmakers and regulators might simply
pursue whatever policies serve their interests and leave questions of constitutionality to the courts. Alternatively, lawmakers and regulators could
invest great time and energy in determining what is and is not constitutional. The abortion dispute suggests, not surprisingly, that the truth lies
somewhere in between. Sorting out why some but not all matters are
given serious attention is useful in understanding both the abortion dispute and the American system of government. This inquiry applies with
equal force to Congress, the executive, and the states. For the purposes
of illustration, only Congress will be considered.
Congressional decision-making is highly visible, greatly observed,
and much criticized. Committee hearings and reports, floor debates, and
amici curiae filings call attention to the seriousness with which Congress
approaches the task of constitutional interpretation. 107 Congress has
made varied use of these tools in its consideration of abortion-related
issues. Little to no attention was paid to constitutional concerns in the
Hyde Amendment debates or the enactment of the Adolescent Family
106. On the issue of whether elected government should interpret the Constitution,
see sources cited supra notes 7, 16. See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 1-33 (2d ed. 1986) (addressing the
history of and justifications for judicial review); Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court
and the Idea of Progress (1971); Symposium, Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of
Supreme Court Decisions, 61 Tul. L. Rev. 977-1095 (1987); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts
and the Constitution, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1001 (1965) (analyzing the political and moral
limits ofjudicial review).
107. See, e.g., Paul Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisionmaker and its Power to
Counter Judicial Doctrine, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 57 (1986) (Congress has neither the institutional
nor political capacity to engage in effective constitutional deliberation); Abner J. Mikva,
How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C. L. Rev. 587
(1983) (same); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63
N.C. L. Rev. 707 (1985) (Congress always has resources and sometimes has the inclination
to interpret the Constitution effectively).
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Life Act (AFLA) .108 In contrast, constitutional concerns seemed to play a
role in Congress' consideration and ultimate rejection of constitutional
amendment proposals, court-stripping proposals, the Human Life Act, 1 09
and the Freedom of Choice Act. 110
The AFLA and Hyde Amendment support Owen Fiss's observation
that legislators are disinterested in the "search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the people."111 The AFLA and
the Hyde Amendment each raised serious constitutional concerns-the
AFLA because it prohibits religious organizations that engage in abortion
counseling from participating in the AFLA program and the Hyde
Amendment because its restrictions on Medicaid funding limit the availability of abortions. In each instance, constitutional challenges were sustained by lower federal courts only to be overturned by bare five member
m~orities in the Supreme Court. 112 Congress, however, appeared indifferent to constitutional concerns when enacting these measures.
The AFLA originated in the Senate Labor and Human Resources
Committee. Hearings held in March 1981 featured the testimony of
economists, doctors, child psychologists, and sociologists-not constitutional scholars. 113 Likewise, the Committee Report makes no mention of
constitutional issues. 114 Indeed, when the AFLA was reauthorized in
1984, Congress seemed relatively unconcerned that a constitutional challenge had been launched against the measure. Subcommittee Chair
Jeremiah Denton simply noted that "[t]he courts will have to decide
whether the law as passed by Congress is constitutional. The task before
the subcommittee and the Congress is to oversee the activities of the current act." 115
108. 42 U.S.C. § 300z-s (1982).
109. See The "Human Life Bill": Hearings on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 1-7,
64-66, 155-64 (1981) (statements by Senators) [hereinafter Hearings on The Human Life
Bill].
110. See Freedom of Choice Act of 1989: Hearings on S.1912 Before the Senate
Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 101st Gong., 2d Sess 1-4 (1990) (statements by
Senators regarding impact of proposed Act on Roe).
111. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms ofjustice, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 10 (1979).
112. See McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp. 630 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding Hyde Amendment); Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F.
Supp. 1547 (D.D.C. 1987), rev'd, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (upholding AFLA).
113. See Oversight of Family Planning Programs, 1981: Hearings on Examination of
the Role of the Federal Gov't in Birth Control, Abortion Referral, and Sex Education
Programs Before the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 97th Gong., 1st Sess.,
(1981).
114. See Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, Adolescent Family Life, S.
Rep. No. 161, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. (1981).
115. Reauthorization of the Adolescent Family Life Demonstration Projects Act of
1981: Hearings on an Overview of the Adolescent Pregnancy Problem and
Reauthorization of Title XX of the Public Health Services Act Before the Subcomm. on
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Congress did not hold hearings or prepare a report when it enacted
the Hyde Amendment. Introduced on the House floor, the Amendment
vvas subject to prolonged, fierce, and emotional debate. While amendment supporters occasionally criticized Rne as "mistaken and immoral"
and Hyde opponents suggested that Congress' refusal "to pay for something guaranteed by the Constitution" is itself unconstitutional, these references were rare and never rose above the level of conclusory
rhetoric. 116 Congress gave more careful attention to constitutional concerns when the Hyde Amendment went before the Supreme Court. A
bipartisan coalition of over 200 members of Congress, including members who voted against Hyde, flied an amicus brief defending Congress'
right not to spend money under the appropriations power. 117
Constitutional concerns did, however, pervade the attacks on Rne
that occurred in the early 1980s. Pro-life forces were empowered through
Republican control of both the White House and the Senate after the
1980 election. In 1981, the Senate Judiciary Committee actively considered human life legislation, court-stripping proposals, and constitutional
amendment proposals. In each case, extensive hearings were dominated
by constitutional law experts. Committee and Subcommittee reports too
were replete with citations to this expert testimony, as well as to Supreme
Court decisions and law review articles. 118 Unlike the Labor and Human
Resources Committee's handling of the AFLA, the Senate Judiciary Committee seemed keenly interested in separation of powers and constitutional interpretation concerns.
Differences between the Judiciary Committee and the Labor and
Human Resources Committee are to be expected. Unlike the AFLA,
where Congress used funding as a mechanism for abortion regulation,
the early 1980s proposals directly challenged both the correctness of Rne
and the propriety ofjudicial involvement in the abortion dispute. Constitutional concerns could not be easily brushed aside in this context.
Moreover, the Judiciary Committee's variable treatment of courtstripping, human life, and constitutional amendment proposals supports
its reputation as a "'Committee of Lawyers' [which] reacts to constitutional questions in a very judicial, courtlike fashion." 119 Court-stripping
proposals, which were savaged as an inappropriate and unconstitutional
interference with a co-equal branch by most constitutional experts as well
Family and Human Services of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Human Resources, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1984).
116. See 122 Cong. Rec. 20,410-12; 30,898; 27,672-75 (1976).
117. See Brief of Rep. Jim Wrigbt, supra note 42.
118. Hearings on the Human Life Bill, supra note 108; Report of the Comm. on the
Judiciary on SJ. Res. 110, Human Life Federalism Amendment, S. Rep. 465, 97th Cong.,
2d Sess., (1982) (with minority views) [hereinafter Report on Human Life Federalism
Amendment].
119. Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees 39
(1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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as Attorney General William French Smith, 120 never emerged from committee. Proposed human life legislation also raised questions about Congress' constitutional authority to respond to court decisions.
Subcommittee Chair John East (Republican, North Carolina) described
the proposal as an "'exercise [of] the authority of Congress ... based on
an investigation of facts and on a decision concerning values that the
Supreme Court has declined to address.' "121 Subcommittee hearings,
however, revealed that most, but not all, legal academics opposed the bill
on constitutional grounds. 122 East persisted and a sharply divided subcommittee reported the bill out, but issued a report presenting three dramatically different assessments of Congress' § 5 authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment. 123 East thought Congress was constitutionally
empowered to find that life begins at conception and to enforce that
finding through legislation. Orrin Hatch (Republican, Utah), although
strongly opposed to Roe, concluded that Congress' § 5 authority does not
include the establishment of substantive rights whether they be voting
rights or a fetus's right to life. Max Baucus (Democrat, Montana) argued
that Congress can establish rights but cannot statutorily overturn
Supreme Court decisions. East, Hatch, and Baucus all made the assessment of Congress' authority the centerpiece of their remarks, with ample
references to case law and the testimony of constitutional experts.
The Human Life Bill never made it to the floor of Congress. Instead,
the full Judiciary Committee focused its efforts on a proposed constitutional amendment to return the abortion issue to the states. This alternative was favored for three reasons. First, it is beyond dispute that
Congress may initiate a constitutional amendment to overturn a Supreme
Court decision. Second, unlike statutory court-stripping and human life
proposals which would nullify Court holdings without following constitutionally specified procedures, constitutional amendment proposals express disapproval of Roe without challenging judicial authority. Third,
"[w]ithout actually moving to outlaw abortion," the Federalism Amendment enabled Congress to "demonstrate [its] concern about [Roe], while at
the same time disposing of this troublesome issue by throwing it back to
the states." 124
120. See Keynes with Miller, supra note 19, at 292-98.
121. See Burgess, supra note 19, at 36-48.
122. See Hearings on the Human Life Bill, supra note 108 (including, e.g., testimony
of Robert Bork, 308-17; testimony and prepared statement of Laurence H. Tribe, 242-55).
123. See Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
The Human Life Bill S.158: Report Together with Additional and Minority Views to the
Committee on the Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 1, 97th Gong., 1st Sess. 20-29, 33-38, 39-43
(1981).
124. Jaffee, et al., supra note 19, at 115. Congress' desire to pass the &e buck back to
the states also explains why the Senate Judiciary Committee did not act on a constitutional
amendment to define a fetus as a person (pp. 137-46); see also Mark A. Graber, The NonMajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 Stud. Am. Pol. Dev. 35,
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Constitutional concerns were given serious treatment at both the
subcommittee and committee level. Subcommittee hearings included
several constitutional experts who discussed both the soundness of Roe
and the appropriateness of checking the court through a constitutional
amendment. 125 The judiciary Committee, which voted 10-7 to report the
amendment out, likewise addressed these constitutional interpretation
and structure of government concerns in its report. 126 Floor debates on
the amendment, although varied, also considered the correctness of Roe
as a matter of constitutional interpretation. 127
Early 1980s anti-abortion initiatives demonstrate Congress' recognition that constitutional interpretation plays a critical role in the abortion
dispute. Critics of Congress are unimpressed by this constitutional exegesis. Paul Brest, for example, argues that the legislative history of the
Human Life Bill reveals that constitutional complications are typically
raised by bill opponents as "rhetorical stratagems" and that proponents
sought to stack the hearing with pro-life witnesses and eventually drafted
a "Subcommittee report [which] reads more like an advocate's brief than
a judicial opinion."128 The fact remains, however, that many abortion
opponents disapproved of human life and court-stripping legislation as a
constitutionally inappropriate substitution of legislative for judicial authority.129 Along the same lines, abortion rights supporters defended the
Hyde Amendment as a constitutionally permissible exercise of the appropriations power.
Whatever one's views of the skillfulness and seriousness with which
Congress approaches constitutional interpretation, abortion politics is
certainly affected by the ways in which Congress balances constitutional
and other concerns. Abortion and American Politics does not consider this
subject, however. Craig and O'Brien offer no guidance on different committees' approaches to constitutional analysis, the relevance of staff-dominated hearings and committee reports to Congress' workproduct, the
role of Supreme Court precedents in Congress' deliberations, and other
such matters. These questions, however, are quite relevant to understanding both the abortion dispute and the political institutions involved
in the dispute. The same can be said of the seriousness with which the
executive branch and the states approach constitutional interpretationanother topic unexplored by Craig and O'Brien.
53-61 (1993) (Congress typically seeks to avoid speaking to the correctness or
incorrectness of Roe).
125. See Hearings on S. 158, supra note 121, at 242, 275, 328 (testimony of Laurence
H. Tribe, William Van Alstyne, and Archibald Cox).
126. See Report on Human Life Federlism Amendment, supra note 117 at 1, 7, 53-54.
127. See 129 Cong. Rec. 17,570-78 (1983).
128. Brest, supra note 106, at 93, 97; see also Burgess, supra note 19, at 48 (Congress'
performance as constitutional interpreter during Human Life hearings "suggest a mixed
result").
129. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
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C. Institutional Concerns

The abortion dispute has exacted a heavy price on all three branches
of the federal government. Specifically, abortion's dominance as a single
issue concern has subordinated competing and otherwise relevant concerns in congressional and executive decision-making. Abortion's dominance has also altered public perceptions of the Supreme Court, if not
the Court's perception of itself.
The nomination and confirmation of federal courtjudges, especially
Supreme CourtJustices, is the most obvious example of how the abortion
issue displaces other concerns. Beginning with Ronald Reagan, presidents have been under great pressure to use support or opposition to
abortion as a "litmus test" in the judicial selection process. Reagan made
"judicial restraint" and opposition to the "creat[ion] [of] new constitutional 'rights' out of thin air" the trademark of his judicial appointments.130 A desire to please pro-life interests figures prominently in this
calculation. Some judicial nominees "'were asked directly about their
views on abortion'" (p. 175, quoting Nina Totenberg); one appeals court
nomination was ·withdrawn after it became known that the nominee contributed to Planned Parenthood (pp. 174-75); and pro-life interests scuttled the planned nomination of federal appeals court Judge Patrick
Higginbotham to the Supreme Court because he recognized-albeit reluctantly-Roe to be the law of the land in one of his opinions. 131 The
Clinton administration appears no different. Candidate Bill Clinton
stated "that a judge ought to be able to answer a question in a Senate
hearing, 'Do you or do you not support the right to privacy, including the
right to choose?' "132 With respect to his Supreme Court nominee Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, Clinton commented that her writings suggest she is prochoice "and that was to me the important thing." 133
The abortion issue has, on occasion, dominated other areas of executive-judicial relations. Abortion, for example, figured largely in the staffing of the Justice Department's Office for Legal Policy (charged with
judicial selection) and the Solicitor General's Office. Rex Lee resigned as
Solicitor General after Reagan's first term, in part because of his unwillingness to respond to administration-condoned interest group pressure
and to ask the Supreme Court to overturn Roe and other disfavored rulings. Speaking of the importance of stare decisis, Lee spoke of resenting
"this notion that my job is to press the Administration's policies at every
turn and announce true conservative principles through the pages of my
briefs. It is not."I 34 Open opposition to abortion, however, had become
130. Markman, supra note 65 at 33.
131. See Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d 994, 995-96 (5th Cir. 1986).
132. Inside Politics (CNN television broadcast, June 30, 1992) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
133. Stephen Labaton, Senators See Easy Approval for Nominee, N.Y. Times, June 16,
1993, at A22.
134. Lincoln Caplan, The Tenth Justice 107 (1987) (quoting Rex Lee).
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a prerequisite of a Reagan administration Solicitor General-Charles
Fried's nomination may well have been contingent on his seeking Rne's
reversal as Acting Solicitor General. ISS
Abortion has likewise affected legislativejudicial relations, becoming
the pivotal issue in Senate Judiciary Committee confirmation hearings.
Starting with the 1981 nomination of Sandra Day O'Connor, Committee
questioning and Committee reports, while paying some attention to
other issues, bespeak a near obsession with right-to-privacy concerns.
David Souter, for example, spoke at his confirmation hearings of Rne v.
Wade as "the one case which has been on everyone's mind and on everyone's lips since the moment of my nomination. "136 Clarence Thomas, in
contrast, caused an uproar by claiming never to have discussed or even
thought about the correctness of Rne v. Wade. Since the Bork nomination, moreover, the Judiciary Committee has made clear to nominees that
a willingness to profess belief in the right to privacy and a respect for
stare decisis is a prerequisite for the job,l37 Indeed, in explaining why
Bork was unacceptable, the Senate Judiciary Committee Report emphasized his "narrow definition of liberty" being at odds with the "image of
human dignity [which] has been associated throughout our history with
the idea that the Constitution recognizes 'unenumerated rights.'"tss
Abortion has also proven surprisingly critical to Congress' annual enactment of the federal budget. Technically, House and Senate rules preclude substantive policymaking through appropriations. 139 This
distinction between authorizations and appropriations is designed to ensure both that fiscal policy concerns dominate debates over the budget
and that committees with subject matter expertise screen authorizing legislation. The Hyde Amendment reveals the limits of the appropriationsauthorizations distinction and, with it, the impossibility of confining appropriations to fiscal policy matters. First enacted in 1976, the Hyde
Amendment has proven a permanent and destabilizing force in appropriations policymaking. Debate over abortion provisions in the fiscal year
1977 rider lasted eleven weeks, with dozens of compromise proposals on
the floor. The fiscal year 1978 stalemate was worse, lasting more than five
135. See Wermeil, supra note 40.
136. Nomination of David H. Souter to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate,
101st Gong., 2d Sess. 54 (1990).
137. See Wermeil, supra note 40, at 124. Pro-choice interests' focus on privacyrather than abortion per se--is understandable. The Block Bork Coalition emphasized
Bork's attack against privacy in order to "pluck the heartstrings of [the] middle class" and
thereby avoid White House charges that the Bork opposition was merely a thinly veiled
pro-choice special interest group. See Fisher & Devins, supra note 14, at 200 (quoting
abortion rights activist Ann Lewis) (alteration in original).
138. S. Exec. Rep. No. 7, lOOth Gong., 1st Sess. 8, 8 (1987).
139. See Devins, supra note 96, at 458 & n.12; Louis Fisher, The Authorization
Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29 Catholic
Univ. L. Rev. 51 (1979).
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months (pp. 119-27). Before deciding the matter, twenty-eight roll call
votes were taken (seventeen in the Senate and eleven in the House), two
continuing resolutions expired, and thousands of federal employees were
threatened with delays in their paychecks. Debates over Hyde and other
abortion-related riders remain contentious. In 1989, the appropriations
process vvas delayed by skirmishes between the White House and Congress over t4e sweep of abortion funding prohibitions. Abortion funding
also proved contentious in 1993. On September 28, 1993, the Senate followed the House's lead by maintaining restrictions on Medicaid funding
of abortions. The 1993 funding restrictions allow for funding in cases of
rape and incest, but otherwise retain the hard line adopted during the
Bush administration. Pro-choice congressmen, however, remain undaunted, predicting ultimate victory when the issue is met in the national
health care arena. 140 The disruption caused by these battles demonstrates the potentially debilitating impact of appropriations-based policy
initiatives on Congress' ability to perform essential legislative functions.
Abortion, finally, has transformed interest group advocacy before the
Supreme Court. When !We was argued, ten amicus briefs were filed;
when Webster was argued, that number had risen to seventy-eight (pp.
212-27).141 Beyond interest group ftlings, the Justices today-as Justice
Scalia bemoaned in Webster-are subject to "carts full of mail from the
public, and streets full of demonstrations, urging us-their unelected
and life-tenured judges ...-to follow the popular will." 142 This avalanche of partisanship, whether healthy or unhealthy, cannot be discounted. It may well explain why Justice O'Connor began her Casey
opinion with the admonition that "[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt. "143
Without question, inter-branch relations as well as the capacity of
each branch to function effectively figure prominently in understanding
abortion's impact on the American political system. The abortion dispute also calls attention to the impact of single issue politics on the
American governmental and political process. The appointment and
confirmation of judicial nominees, the Hyde Amendment debates, and
Supreme Court advocacy reveal the profound impact that the abortion
dispute has had on the affected governmental actors. Abortion and
American Politics makes clear that abortion figures prominently in appropriations policy (pp. 108-37) as well as judicial selection (pp. 173-85),
but does not comment on these institutional concerns. Furthermore,
Craig and O'Brien, while doing a fine job of explaining the origins and
140. See Eric Pianin, Senate Keeps Medicaid Abortion limits, Wash. Post, Sept. 29,
1993 at A-ll.
141. See generally, Susan Behuniak-Long, Friendly Fire: Amici Curiae and Websterv.
Reproductive Health Services, 74Judicature 261 (1991).
142. Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 535 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
143. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1992).
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mobilizations of pro-choice and pro-life interest groups (pp. 35-71), do
not commen~ on the relationship of single issue politics to governance
issues.
D. Elected Government Attitudes Toward the Judiciary

The Supreme Court, while it does not have the "last word" on the
abortion dispute, is a critical part of the dynamic that defines the reaches
and limits of abortion rights. What role the Court plays in shaping abortion rights is quite another matter. Common sense suggests a positive
correlation between the respect accorded Roe and the judiciary's influence in defining the abortion issue. Along the same lines, common sense
suggests a positive correlation between changes in abortion rates following Roe and the decision's impact on people's lives. What then if abortion rates have not changed after Roe or elected government has sought
to undermine the decision through massive legislative and administrative
resistance? Does this mean that Roe is inconsequential or that elected
government does not take Court edicts seriously? These questions figure
largely in the abortion dispute and the relevance of this dispute to an
understanding of American political institutions.
Roe clearly is consequential. 144 By overturning forty-six state abortion laws, Roe triggered unprecedented legislative and adininistrative activism at both the federal and state level. Abartion and American Politics
spends close to four hundred pages describing that activism; this review
spends most of its pages calling attention to gaps that still remain in that
descriptive summary. Roe also helps explain the rise in the number of
legal abortions from 586,800 in 1972 to 1,553,900 in 1980. 145 Roe's checking of state power enabled market mechanisms to make relatively affordable abortions more readily available. For example, the number of women
who could not obtain an abortion shrunk from over 1,000,000 in 1973 to
less than 600,000 in 1977.146 In freeing the market (especially in authorizing nonhospital abortions), Roe has spurred changes in access to abortion in the most restrictive states (due to increased availability) and
among poor women (due to increased affordability) .147 By affecting both
144. For an argument that Roe was inconsequential, see Rosenberg, supra note 19, at
229-46. For critiques of Rosenberg, see Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social
Reform, 102Yale LJ. 1763,1777-80 (1993); Neal Devins,Judicial Matters, 80 Calif. L. Rev.
1027, 1054-65 (1992) (book review).
145. See Rosenberg, supra note 19, at 180.
146. See Jacqueline D. Forrest et al., Abortion in the United States, 1976-1977, 10
Fam. Plan. Persp. 271, 272 (1978).
147. See Susan B. Hansen, State Implementation of Supreme Court Decisions:
Abortion Rates since Roe v. Wade, 42J. Politics 372, 379 (1980). In addition, the abortion
procedure has become safer as a consequence of Roe. From 1963 to 1973, the death rate
for women as a result of abortion was roughly 5.7 per one million persons, with criminal
procedures accounting for 75% of abortion deaths from 1940 to 1972. See id. at 378.
After Roe, the number of women's deaths fell from pre-Roe figures of 57 per year to six in
1974, three in 1976, and none in 1979. See Jesse H. Choper, Consequences of Supreme
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abortion rates and the delivery of abortion services, the decision's practical impact helped catalyze pro-life efforts to politically nullify Roe.
Supreme Court abortion decisions also offer telling evidence of
elected government attitudes toward the Court. Rather than suggest cavalier disrespect for judicial authority by elected government, the vast majority of post-Roe action reveals that elected government generally
respects Court decision-making, but is not afraid to test the boundaries of
those decisions. To be sure, most elected government action has sought
to limit abortion rights. At the same time, no federal and virtually no
state action has directly challenged Supreme Court edicts. The Hyde
Amendment, the AFLA, and family planning and fetal tissue regulations
do not contradict Roe and its progeny. In contrast, proposals that sought
to nullifY Roe-human life legislation, court-stripping, and constitutional
amendment-were rejected by Congress. At the state level, only a handful
of states have played a leadership role in enacting stringent abortion laws.
Most states wait to see if the courts will approve these "challenger" state
initiatives. 148 Furthermore, most "challenger state action" is not clearly at
odds with Court decisions, but tests the limits of these decisions. For example, Roe did not explicitly address parental or spousal consent, public
funding, hospital-only abortions, or waiting periods. State action on
those subjects engages the judiciary in a dialogue on the sweep of abortion rights; it does not necessarily challenge Court authority.
The possibility that elected government output may not measure
elected government preferences also suggests that too much should not
be read into elected government resistance to Roe. Many elected officials
were quietly pleased by Roe. John Hart Ely, for example, speaks of "[t]he
sighs of relief as this particular albatross '\vas cut from the legislative and
executive necks. "149 That an avalanche of abortion restrictions were enacted may only mean that legislators saw no downside in responding to
pro-life interest groups because pro-choice concerns were content to
leave it to the courts to protect their interests. In a sense, federal and
state efforts to limit abortion rights paid homage to a judiciary who would
toe the line and provide whatever constitutional protections were
appropriate.
Federal and state responses to Webster support this hypothesis.
Rather than prompting a new wave of abortion regulation, legislative inertia followed in Webster's wake. Many legislators would have preferred
that the Court retain control over abortion and not return the issue to
elected government. This reaction is not surprising. Knowing that proCourt Decisions Upholding Individual Constitutional Rights, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 185-86
(1984).
148. See generally Glen Halva-Neubauer, Abortion Policy in the Post-Webster Age, 20
Publius 27, (1990) (assessing nexus between pre- and post-Webster state anti-abortion
legislation).
149. John H. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale
LJ. 920, 947 (1973).
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choice forces were "going to take names ·and kick ankles,"I5o Webster
made right-to-life initiatives less likely to succeed. Instead, the Roe-created "status quo" became the governing norm-despite the fact that Roe
had earlier invalidated forty-six state laws.
Elected government perceptions about the judicial role and the respect owed Supreme Court decisions figure prominently in the story of
abortion politics. The dialogue that takes place between the courts and
federal and state government is highly nuanced. For example, rather
than legislatively responding to family planning regulations before the
Rust v. Sullivan decision, Congress deferred to the Supreme Court in the
hopes that it could avoid the issue altogether. When the Court upheld
the regulations, legislative repeal efforts targeted both the Court for its
decision and the White House for its support of that decision.t5t One
cannot simply conclude, as Craig and O'Brien do, that Supreme Court
decisions are not final. Elected government has chosen certain types of
limite9- responses and rejected more confrontational approaches. That is
telling. It is also telling that federal and state officials, while supporting
measures at odds with abortion rights, may well have preferred that the
Court maintain a stranglehold on this issue. Abortion and American Politics,
while very much concerned with Supreme Court decisions, does not fully
explore the judiciary's role in the abortion dispute. Roe's impact on abortion rights and elected government attitudes toward the Court are not
given serious treatment. These issues, however, are critically important to
the abortion dispute and the relevance of that dispute to American political institutions.
Craig and O'Brien are correct in choosing the abortion dispute as a
lens through which to view American political institutions. Abortion,
among other things, highlights the institutional tugs and pulls which help
explain elected government decision-making, the seriousness with which
elected government approaches constitutional interpretation, the impact
of single issue politics on the political process, and elected government
attitudes toward the judiciary. Abortion and American Politics, however,
does not address these questions. It presents "an illustrative portrait ...
of the American governmental and political process" (p. xv) without providing guidance to understanding the ramifications of that portrait. Perhaps fearful that any commentary will shatter their efforts to provide a
neutral account, Craig and O'Brien leave it to the reader to sort out the
lessons of the abortion dispute. This Part, by utilizing examples found in
the book, has suggested what some of those lessons might be.
CONCLUSION

Abortion and American Politics concludes with the observation that
"[t]he abortion controversy will remain a driving force in and a reflection
150. 135 Cong. Rec. H4928 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1989) (statem~nt of Rep. AuCoin).
151. See 137 Cong. Rec. H10491-508 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1991).
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of American politics" (p. 359). After two decades of elected branch responses to Rne and its progeny, Craig and O'Brien's prediction seems a
near certainty. Indeed, it is hard to imagine abortion not playing a prominent role in a Supreme Court appointment, a Medicaid appropriation, a
presidential or gubernatorial· campaigu, or a host of other -policy issues.
That the abortion dispute will persist is beyond cavil. All the same,
the prospects of executive-legislativejudicial equilibrium on the abortion
issue seem better today than at any time since the modern abortion controversy emerged in the 1960s. At the federal level, no branch of government is at war with another, and public policy generally matches public
opinion. Unpopular Reagan-Bush initiatives on fetal tissue research and
family planning counseling (p. 274) have been rejected and seem unlikely to return. In contrast, abortion funding restrictions, which are acceptable to the courts and remain popular with Congress and much of
the nation, persist. While the Clinton administration may disfavor these
measures, that disapproval (at least for the time being) does not merit a
fight over the funding ban. Likewise, with public opinion strongly supportive of parental notification and consent laws (pp. 274-75), there is
little mystery in Congress' failure to enact a Freedom of Choice Act that
either curtails parental rights or guarantees federal funding for
abortions.
State action, although more variable, is generally stable. Louisiana,
Utah, and Pennsylvania used Webster as a wedge to enact restrictive abortion regulations. But these states are the exception, not the rule. Where
states have acted, they have generally stayed within the prevailing norms
of public opinion, symbolically codifying abortion rights and/ or enacting
parental consent and notification provisions. 152 In the vast majority of
states, moreover, the pre-Webster "status quo". remains the governing
standard.
The Supreme Court seems quite comfortable with and is in· part responsible for the current state of affairs. Court doctrine has both shaped
and been shaped by elected branch decision-making. Rne nationalized
abortion rights at a time when state reform efforts, while on the rise,
could not guarantee success. Twenty-one years later, as reflected in the
failure of statutory and constitutional amendment repeal efforts as well as
Casey's utilization of stare decisis to reaffirm Rne, the "durability of the
"central holding of Rnt/' 153 seems assured. The Court, however, has given
way to elected branch counter-initiatives. Abortion funding restrictions
have been upheld, some parental rights have been recognized, and the
Court has left the development of administrative regulations to the political process. Furthermore, while rejecting Reagan and Bush administration efforts to overturn Rne, the "undue burden" test advocated by
152. See Halva-Neubauer, supra note 147, at 32-41.
153. City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 438
(1983).
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Solicitor General Rex Lee in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, Inc. 154 seems the governing standard in state regulation cases. 155
The emerging equilibrium on abortion rights will not end this dispute. Pro-choice and pro-life interests are too polarized and too powerful
for there to be a common ground on abortion. Abortion battles, however, may prove less fierce and less destabilizing. With public opinion
and public policy in rough accord, there is little reason for elected government or the courts to disrupt this awkward balance.
Attaining an equilibrium, as Craig and O'Brien ably demonstrate,
did require all branches and all levels of government to do battle with
each other. This dynamic process has yielded a very nuanced, very delicate (if not very deliberate) compromise. That this interactive process
may appear a bit too much like the making of sausage helps explain Craig
and O'Brien's characterization of the abortion dispute as an "illustrative
... [and] disappointing reflection" (p. xv) of the American system. Nevertheless, our system is one, as Justice Ginsburg rightly observed at her confirmation hearing, where courts "do not guard constitutional rights
alone. Courts share that profound responsibility with Congress, the President, the states, and the people. "156
The abortion dispute makes clear that this dynamic is never-ending.
A state of perpetual change, rather than being problematic, is the greatest strength of this dynamic process. Changing circumstances demand
that constitutional meaning not be too inflexible. Just as the judiciary
leaves its mark on society, so society drives the agenda and decisions of
the courts. "The great tides and currents which engulf the rest of men,"
as Justice Cardozo put it, "do not tum aside in their course and pass the
judges by."1 57 Elected government action, by treating the Constitution as
part and parcel of everyday politics, ensures that constitutional doctrine
and decision-makers operate within the confines of contemporary mores.
Abortion and American Politics, despite its lapses, puts into focus this dynamic nature of constitutional decision-making.

154. See 462 U.S. at 465 n.10 (O'Connor,]., dissenting).
155. See supra note 59.
156. Joan Biskupic, Ginsburg Stresses Value oflncremental Change, Wash. Post, July
21, 1993, at A-6.
157. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 168 (1921).
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